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Executive Summary
Ever since the devastating attacks of 9/11, America has made terrorism prevention a top
priority, and the Department of Homeland Security has transferred billions of dollars to states
in Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism programs. However, there has been much debate
on how these funds are allocated, many speculating that some states receive more funding
than others as “pork.”

Basing an analysis of funding on a variety of determinants, it can be concluded that this
speculation might very well be the case. An analysis of allocation of federal Homeland Security
funds to states was conducted, hypothesizing the following variables were determinants of
funding: population, gross domestic product (GDP), level of threat, if the political party of the
state’s elected Governor matches that of the sitting President, whether the state’s Electoral
College Representatives voted for the winning President, whether the state Homeland Security
Office is paired with the Division of Emergency Management (or Public Safety), and if the state
has representatives on an Appropriations Subcommittee for Homeland Security.

The results conclude that population, GDP, being paired with Emergency Management, a
state’s Electoral College Representatives voting for the winning president, and a state having
Representatives on a Subcommittee of Appropriations on Homeland Security influence federal
funding. Threat, however, has no influence on funding allocation, a finding that can raise a lot
of questions.
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Problem Statement & Research Question
After the events of 9/11, there is no denying that the threat of terrorism is real; although
the level of threat that terrorism still poses is an issue that is debatable. In an effort to
enhance the safety of American citizens, the Department of Homeland Security was created,
with the mission to “ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism
and other hazards.”1 Since 2003, Homeland Security has allocated approximately $31
billion in grants to states. Arguably, this large amount of money has been effective in
keeping the U.S. safe, since there has not been a successful large-scale terrorist attack since
2001. Ideally, the safety and security of each individual citizen would be addressed equally,
and Homeland Security funding to states would follow a specific measurement system,
ensuring that funding is proportional to state population and is allocated based on a level of
threat estimated by a reliable and inclusive risk estimation model. However, there has been
much speculation that representatives may be using Federal Homeland Security funding to
states as pork, or in other terms, that representatives are influencing the allocation of funds
to benefit their states. This speculation has circulated so much that even Representatives
are speaking up, Congressman Chris Cox (R-California) stating, “This should be all about
national security, and less about pork and politics.”2
This misallocation of funds potentially leads to some states receiving disproportionally
higher amounts of funding, and in turn, other states might end up receiving insufficient
1

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Our Mission: Overview.” Accessed March 30th, 2012.
http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission
2 Earle, Geoff. 2004. “This Should be All About Homeland Security, and Less About Pork and Politics,
Homeland Security Money has Not Been Flowing to the Places in Danger, and Some Members are Worried.”
The Hill. Available September 8, 2006. Accessed March 31, 2013.
http://www.hillnews.com/news/040704/security.aspx
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funding, thus potentially reducing the security of the citizens and critical infrastructure of
those states. So, on what basis is Homeland Security funding distributed to states? That is,
what are the determinants of funding to states?

Literature Review
Homeland Security Grant Funding Overview
In order to understand on what basis funds are allocated, one must first understand the
venues through which funds are allocated. The Homeland Security Grant Program, created
in 2003, is the “primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of State and local
partners to take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of a terrorist
attack and to respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe.”3 Federal
Homeland Security funds are distributed to states through these grants. There are several
Homeland Security Grant Programs, but the most funded (and thus consequential), are the
following six programs:


Citizen Corps Program (CCP);



Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG);



State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP);



Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP);



Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS);



And the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).

A short description of each program’s main purposes is located in Table 1.

3

Masse, Todd. O’Neil, Sioban. Rollins, John. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33858. “The Department
of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress.”
Published February 2, 2007. Accessed March 29th, 2012.
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Table 1: Description of Programs

Grant Program

Short Description

Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention
Program (LETPP)

In FY2004 DHS appropriations, Congress directed DHS to establish a
local law enforcement terrorism prevention program for states and
localities. LETPP provides funds to support activities to establish and
enhance state and local law enforcement efforts to prevent and
respond to terrorist attacks.
Created to coordinate volunteer organizations with the mission to make
local communities safe and prepared to respond to any emergency
situation. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) is the only
program that the Citizen Corps administers that funds volunteer first
responders. Smallest of the programs analyzed in this study.

Citizen Corps Program
(CCP)

Emergency Management Designed to assist in the development, maintenance, and improvement
Performance Grant
of state and local emergency management capabilities. It provides
Program (EMPG)
support to state and local governments to achieve measurable results in
key functional areas of emergency management.
State Homeland Security Authorizes purchase of specialized equipment to enhance state and
Grant Program (SHSGP) local agencies’ capability in preventing and responding to WMD
incidents and other terrorist incidents, and provides funds for
protecting critical infrastructure, and for designing, developing,
conducting, and evaluating terrorism response exercises; developing
and conducting counter-terrorism training programs; and updating and
implementing each state’s Homeland Security Strategy.
Metropolitan Medical
Discretionary program that assists DHS-selected jurisdictions with
Response System (MMRS) funding to develop plans and training, and conduct exercises related to
terrorist attacks. Funding is intended to enhance jurisdictions’ capability
in responding to WMD mass casualty events.
Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI)

Discretionary program that provides funding to high-risk, high-threat
urban areas (including counties and mutual aid partners), to prepare
for, prevent, and respond to terrorist incidents.

4

4

Maguire, Steven. Reese, Shawn. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33770. “Department of Homeland
Security Grants to States and Local Governments FY2003 to FY2006.” Published December 22, 2006.
Accessed March 31, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33770.pdf
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The next question is, what factors, if any, influence the Homeland Security Grant Program?
Many of us have heard the scandalous stories of improper use of spending: states using
grant funding to purchase items such as 13 sno-cone machines in Michigan, a $98,000
underwater robot in Columbus, Ohio, and an armored vehicle for a tiny New Hampshire
town that uses it to patrol the annual pumpkin festival.5 These stories of excessive
spending can be infuriating, especially to tax payers when the economy is in an extended
slow recovery from recession, and government budgets are highly stressed.
One reasoning behind this improper use of money could be the fact that every state is
ensured 0.75 percent of all Homeland Security Grant Program funding. This leads to a big
discrepancy in per-capita funding. For instance, in 2004, citizens of Wyoming (the least
populous state in the U.S.) received $40.64 in funding per citizen; New York, on the other
hand, only received $8.94 per citizen.6 Some states have a lesser population to ensure the
safety of, and may have a much lower risk of a terrorist attack, yet receive
disproportionally more funds per capita than higher populated, higher risk states. In turn,
some of the former states may have received more money than they can spend reasonably
(thus the purchase of sno-cone makers).
Of course, there may be underlying factors that influence how much funding each state
gets. When the Department of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Grant
Program, was first created in 2003, they used a basic funding formula to ensure that all
5

Solomon, John. “Senator Slams Homeland Program for Wasteful, Frivolous Spending.” The Washington
Guardian. Published December 14, 2012. Accessed March 31, 2013.http://www.washingtonguardian.com/
homelands-urban-follies-0
6 Maguire, Steven. Reese, Shawn. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33770. “Department of Homeland
Security Grants to States and Local Governments FY2003 to FY2006.” Published December 22, 2006.
Accessed March 31, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33770.pdf
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states received funding. In the beginning, Homeland Security based its funding equations
on population, each state receiving 0.75 percent of total funds, and the rest of the funds
being allocated based on population; the only exceptions were the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) and Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), which were
completely discretionary programs, in which funds were allocated based on risk as
determined by the Department of Homeland Security. The fair-share approach to most of
the grant programs lasted for three years until 2006, when Congress forced DHS to change
their fair-share formulas to better incorporate risk through the DHS Appropriations Act.
The formula changed for the LETPP and SHSGP, in which all states would still receive .75
percent of the funds, but the remainder of funds for these programs would be allocated
based on risk. The criteria are listed in Table 2.
This shift from fair-share non-discretionary allocation to risk-based discretionary funding
opens up the question of whether or not political factors influence discretionary program
funding to states. It is important to note that although Congress determines how much
funding the Department of Homeland Security receives for its grant programs, and
monitors spending, Homeland Security is ultimately the one who makes decisions on how
funds are allocated to states.

HSGP: An Analysis of the Determinants of Federal Homeland Security Funding to States

Miles 7

Table 2: Grant Program Formulas
Program 2003
CCP
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
EMPG
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
LETPP
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
SHSGP
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
MMRS
All funds distributed
according to risk.
UASI

2004
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
All funds distributed
according to risk.

2005
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
All funds distributed
according to risk.

2006
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to
population share.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to risk.
Each state gets 0.75
percent of total
funds, the remaining
funds distributed
according to risk.
All funds distributed
according to risk.

All funds distributed All funds distributed All funds distributed All funds distributed
according to risk.
according to risk.
according to risk.
according to risk.

Applied analysis
When beginning my capstone, I first looked to previously conducted research and analyses;
unfortunately, there are only a few published academic analyses regarding the
determinants of Homeland Security Grant Program funding. This could perhaps be because
the Department of Homeland Security has only existed for 10 years, a relatively short time
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in comparison to many other governmental agencies. Only two sources report research
similar to my Capstone, and even at that, there are quite a few major differences in our
approaches.
Prante and Bohora
In their study “What Determines Homeland Security Spending?: An Econometric analysis of
the Homeland Security Grant Program,” Prante and Bohora focus their study on the State
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP),LETPP, CCP, and UASI programs from the years
2004-2006. In determining their independent variables, they include a variety of political
affluences, their model being:
FUNDINGf = < RISK, POLITICS, POWER >
(Where RISK is a vector of one or more variables measuring a state’s risk of terrorist attack,
POLITICS is a vector of one or more variables measuring the party affiliation of a state’s
elected officials, and POWER is a vector of one or more variables measuring the
connectedness or influence of a state’s elected officials within Congress.)
The vector POLITICS is comprised of a constructed index variable, BLUE-RED-INDEX,
measuring the party affiliation of the elected officials in a state. BLUE-RED-INDEX is the
sum of four variables: BUSH-2000 and BUSH- 2004 are indicator variables coded as 1 if a
state was carried by George W. Bush in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections,
respectively. R-SENATE is the proportion of a state’s Senators who are Republican and RHOUSE is the proportion of a state’s Representatives who are Republican. BUSH-2000,
BUSH-2004, R-SENATE, and R-HOUSE are summed to create BLUE- RED-INDEX.
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The vector Power is based on the potential influence of states’ elected officials, assigning a
value of 1 if a state’s elected official is: Speaker of the House, House Majority or Minority
Leader, Senate Majority or Minority Leader, House Majority or Minority Whip, Senate
Majority or Minority Whip, a member of the House DHS committee, or the Chair or ranking
minority member of any House or Senate Committee (including committees not involved in
Homeland Security Appropriations). They also include a variety of variables such as
population, whether or not a state is a border or coastal state, and per capita income of a
state. For the Vector RISK, they use the AIR Terrorism Loss Estimation Model.
AIR, a private company has created a Terrorism Loss Estimation Model, in which they
categorize states as high, medium, or low risk security states based on 10 catastrophic risks
(although it does not include natural disasters). Convening terrorism experts and former
employees of the FBI, CIA, and Department of Defense, AIR developed its model is through
an application of the Delphi method, in which critical infrastructure, tourist attraction, and
high profile targets are included in assessing risk.7 Although I could not attain access to the
exact variables they include in their model, it seems to be a sound and inclusive estimator
of risk.
Performing an OLS regression analysis, they conclude in their results that RISK is indeed a
positive and statistically significant determinant of funding, disproving the notion that
funds are being allocated as pork instead of risk or threat. 8

7

AIR Worldwide. Terrorism Loss Estimation Model. Accessed March 31, 2013. http://www.airworldwide.com/Models/Terrorism/
8
Prante, Tyler, and Alok K. Bohara. 2008. What determines homeland security spending? An econometric
analysis of the Homeland Security Grant Program. Policy Studies Journal 36 (2).
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Goerdel
In a recent similar study, Holly Goerdel found results concluding the opposite of Prante and
Bohora. In her study, she studies whether politics versus risk determines government
spending across the Citizen Corps Program (CCP), State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI), programs from the years 2004-2006. Her findings support
politics over risk when programs are designed to award universal benefits to elected
officials, such as with fair-sharing policies. However, she does conclude that risk explains
funding when programs award narrow, particularistic benefits, such as with urban security
initiatives. A key conclusion of her study is that fair-share strategies in grant politics can
actually produce unfair allocation outcomes in the area of security.
Although Goerdel and Bohora & Prante use similar models, some of their variables differ
slightly. Although Goerdel uses the same measurements for RISK, leadership positions in
Congress, and a Blue-Red Index for politics, she groups her programs based on
discretionary and non-discretionary (Universal and Exclusive benefits) and compares the
regressions of each, which I find more revealing, and prefer as a model.9
Using their research, I make my first, and perhaps most obvious, hypothesis:
H1: Those states at a higher risk for terrorism funding will receive more funding
than those posed with a lower risk.
In addition, their analysis influenced my choosing of independent variables, especially
political factors, although there are quite a few differences between them. For instance, I
9

Goerdel, Holly. “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants.” Published December 23,
2012. Accessed March 31, 2013.
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take into consideration whether or not a state Homeland Security Office shares a physical
location with the Division of Emergency Management or Public Safety, and also use a
different model to estimate risk, as will be discussed later.

Political factors
Determining the factors that influence Homeland Security Grant Program funding can be
thought of in terms of V.O. Key’s basic budgeting problem “On what basis shall it be decided
to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?” Or, in this particular case, “On what
basis was it determined that Homeland Security awarded grant funds to state A instead of
state B?”10
Congressional Dominance Theory
When thinking of possible political factors, it is a general notion to first look to Congress,
and the power its members hold. In a study on Congressional Dominance Theory by Moe,
the author examines just how powerful they are.11 Congressional dominance theory, in its
simplest terms, says that Congress controls the bureaucracy, and that decision-making in
Congress is self-interested and specialized. This is based on politicians’ desire to be reelected. In order to get re-elected, politicians gain influence over a set of issues that are
relevant to their constituency, and the best way to increase their chance is to become
committee members in those specific policy areas. This theory also contends that the

10

Key, V.O. (1940). The Lack of a Budgetary Theory. The American Political Science Review, 34(6),
pp.1137-1144.
11 Moe, T. M. (1987). An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance’. Legislative
Studies Quarterly, 12(4), pp.475-520.
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exchange of influence on policy, agenda management, and the symbiotic relationship with
agencies give Congress control over federal agencies. Because they have this control, the
congressional dominance theory implies that Congress ultimately has control over
resource distribution, and in this specific case, Congress would have control over
Homeland Security Funding to states.
Congressional Dominance Theory would support the claim that the members of the House
and Senate Subcommittees of Appropriations on Homeland Security would like to please
the constituents of their states in order to get re-elected, and one means of doing so would
be to secure more funds to their state Homeland Security Offices; basically, members of the
Subcommittees would use Homeland Security Grant funds as “pork,” which leads me to
hypothesize:
H2: States with Representatives on the House and Senate Subcommittees of
Appropriations for Homeland Security receive more Homeland Security Grant
Program funding than states without.
Electoral College
It may be a point of concern that those states supporting George Bush in his campaigns and
election may have received more funding than those who did not. One may believe that as
president, and perhaps in order to ensure re-election, he may have wanted to make sure
his constituents had the best protection available, as might any elected figure; thus, the
same can be said of Obama. So, it is only natural to assume that states whose Electoral
College Representatives voted for the winning president would receive more Homeland
Security Grant Program funding.
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However, in a study of the political determinants of Federal expenditures at the State level,
Hoover and Pecorino conclude that Electoral votes are actually negatively associated with
spending in several categories, with coefficients indicating that the overall effect is large,
and found evidence that states which voted for the sitting president receive less spending
per capita compared to states the sitting president lost by a narrow margin. 12
In this specific case, the following can be hypothesized:
H3: States whose Electoral College Representatives voted for the winning president
receive more funding than those states that didn’t.
State Governor’s Political Party Affiliation
Each State Homeland Security Office is lead by an executive director or manager who is
appointed by the state governor. Generally speaking, it is almost assured that this
appointee’s political party will match that of the governor, considering that it is likely that
the governor will wish to have someone in charge with the same political ideology as
him/herself. The same could theoretically be said of the president, who would prefer that
whoever is in charge of the state’s Homeland Security Office has the same ideology as he
does, and will be more likely to spend funds in a way supporting his agenda. With this
reasoning, the following can be hypothesized:
H4: Those states whose governor’s political party affiliation matches that of the
sitting president’s will receive more Homeland Security Grant Program funding.

12

Hoover, Gary A., and Paul Pecorino. 2003. “The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State
Level.” University of Alabama Economics, Finance and Legal Studies Working Paper No. 03-04-01.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=395084
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Emergency Management
During my time as an intern at the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security (KOHS), I realized
that not all state offices of Homeland Security are created equally, or operate in the same
way. Although KOHS was an extremely small office, we were an independent operation,
with our own office location. We would work closely with the Division of Emergency
Management, who was housed in a separate location, but the task was often difficult—nonresponsive emails, difficulty in scheduling meetings without time conflicts, and often
having to travel to a different location when working on projects. Although physical
distance does not always impede effective collaboration, and conversely, being located in
the same building does in no way guarantee collaboration, the likelihood is greater in the
latter case. Many other states, unlike Kentucky, have their Office of Homeland Security and
Division of Emergency Management, or Division of Public Safety (or both), housed in the
same office location. The convenience of this arrangement can be expected to be much
more conducive to getting work done in a timely and efficient manner, and thus, it can be
argued that those states whose Office of Homeland Security and Division of Emergency
Management physically share an office location are more productive and efficient. Under
the assumption that arrangements with a higher likelihood of being effective receive more
funding, I expect that co-located Homeland Security Offices receive more funding:
H5: Those states whose Office of Homeland Security and Division of Emergency
Management physically share an office location receive more Homeland Security
Grant Program funding than those that do not.
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Although there is no literature to support this hypothesis, I thought it would be interesting
and beneficial to include in my analysis.

Data Collection
Dependent variables
It has proven somewhat difficult to collect data in regards to the Homeland Security Grant
Program. Although data has been published regarding how much the Department of
Homeland Security has allocated each year through its various programs, it was extremely
difficult to find data on funds allocated to each individual state. Fortunately, the U.S. Census
Bureau, along with the U.S. Department of Commerce publishes a “Federal Aid to States
Report” each year, and I was able to collect information regarding funds allocated to states
for “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” Programs. This has been published for
the years 2004-2010; however, this only gives a lump sum of funds granted to states,
sharing no detail about funds allocated through each individual grant. Analyzing total funds
could give a broad scope of the determinants influencing grant fund allocation, but I also
wanted to take a look at what was happening in a narrower spectrum.
Fortunately, I was able to find a CRS Report that listed Homeland Security Grant Funding
by individual grant to states; unfortunately, it was only for the years 2003-2006.
This CRS report has been widely used by those analyzing Homeland Security Grant
Funding; however, there have been differences in what data is used. For instance, in her
research, Goerdel focused mainly comparing the SHSGP and UASI programs (the most
funded), whereas Prante & Bohora focused more individually on each of the four programs
they analyzed. However, for the purpose of my analysis, I decided that if figures were
available for six of the major programs, then it would be interesting to analyze all of them,
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despite size. The six programs, Citizen Corps Program (CCP), Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program (EMPG), State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP),
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), Metropolitan Medical Response
System (MMRS), and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the first three of which are
non-discretionary, the latter three discretionary, were analyzed.
*All funds analyzed were discounted to reflect 2003 real dollars.

Independent Variables
Risk Factors: Threat
When it came to determining the independent variables that would influence Homeland
Security Grant Program Funding, the most basic and vital factor one would think of would
be threat or risk of a terrorist attack that each state faces. The question is: how do you
determine risk? Something so interpretive can be hard to get a firm grasp on, and
definitions and indicators of risk are different for almost every risk or threat analysis. The
risk assessment model that the Department of Homeland Security uses is unknown, and is
top secret, as it should be. However, as previously mentioned, Goerdel and Prante & Bohara
both use the AIR Terrorism Estimation Loss Model.
For the sake of this analysis, the AIR Model would have been wonderful to use as a risk
estimator. Unfortunately, I could not obtain the indicators of this model, so I decided to
create my own estimation model for risk. Given the time constraints, I decided to use a very
transparent and clear model for assessing the risks that each state faces. This model
encompasses the following criteria, each used as a dummy variable and each state being
assigned a value of 1 if they meet the criteria, and a value of 0 otherwise, leading to a
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maximum possible value of four:
1. Borders Mexico;
2. Borders Canada;
3. Coastal;
4. Has a mass transit system (subway, metro, or light-rail);
5. Has a major metropolitan area with a population of 500,000+ (based on 2000
Census information: U.S. Municipalities Over 50,000).
Although my risk estimation model is admittedly very rudimentary, it encompasses the
most basic criteria that would heighten the chance of a terrorist attack, and should suffice
in explaining whether or not threat is truly a determinant of Homeland Security Grant
Program funding. This is best explained in a CRS Report for Congress concerning Homeland
Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology:
“Terrorism risk analysis and assessment do not exist in a vacuum. Risk is analyzed and
assessed as a means to mitigate or “buy down” risk over time by developing certain
capabilities across the country. At DHS, the State Homeland Security Grant Program is
the primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of State and local partners to
take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of a terrorist attack and to
respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe. Regardless of the complexity
of the risk assessment methodology, due to the inherent uncertainties associated with
assessing risk in a dynamic counterterrorism context, some level of flexibility in
managing risk may be necessary.”13

13

Masse, Todd. O’Neil, Sioban. Rollins, John. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33858. “The Department
of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress.”
Published February 2, 2007. Accessed March 29th, 2012.
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Given the variance of threat models, and the ever-changing nature of terrorism, I feel that
my choice of simple criteria is justified. Although it could be argued that I could have easily
included historical sites and major tourist attractions in the model, almost every state
meets those criteria, and thus they would not allow me to distinguish between different
levels of threat.
Political Factors: Appropriations, EC/Prez, Gov/Prez, Paired/EM
Appropriations—The independent variable Appropriations is based on the total number of
Representatives a state has on both the House and Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations
for Homeland Security. Possible values range from 0-6.

EC/Prez—This is a dummy variable, in which states are assigned a value of 1 if their
Representatives for the Electoral College voted for the winning president in the 2000,
2004, and 2008 elections, and a value of 0 if they voted for a losing presidential candidate.

Gov/Prez—This is a dummy variable, in which states whose elected Governor’s political
party affiliation matches that of the sitting president are assigned a value of 1, and a value
of 0 if the state governor and the president have different political party affiliations.

Paired/EM—This is a dummy variable, in which states whose Homeland Security Office is
physically shared with their Emergency Management Office or Division of Public Safety (or
both) are assigned a value of 1, and those whose offices are in different physical locations
(different buildings) are assigned a value of 0.
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Control Factors
I control for state population, based on the 2000 Census, as well as for each state’s gross
domestic product (GDP) for the years 2003-2010, discounted to reflect 2003 real dollars.

The expected results of relationships are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Expected Impacts

Independent Variable
Appropriations
EC/Prez
Gov/Prez
Paired/EM
Threat
Population
GDP

Total Domestic
Preparedness and
Anti-Terrorism
Funds

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

CCP

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

EMPG SHSGP LETPP MMRS UASI

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)

Research Models
I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for each of the six grant programs,
as well as for the total of “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” funding. To observe
the effects, I created a panel dataset. Panel data observe the dependent variables across
time for a set of units, here states, more than once. In my case, the states are observed
repeatedly for a series of years. Because of lack of published information available
regarding the dependent variables, my analysis can be thought of as two separate
regression formulas and two different analyses in general.
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Model 1
The first model is a regression of the total amount of funding spent on all “Domestic
Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” programs across the years 2004-2010.
The model is specified as:
Yf = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 +e _

Where Yf denotes the total amount funded to states through “Anti-Terrorism and Domestic
Preparedness” programs, X1 – X7 represent the seven independent variables Appropriations, EC/Prez,
Gov/Prez, Paired/EM, Threat, Population, and GDP, and e _denotes the random error in the model.

Or, more specifically:
Totalf = β0 + AppropriationsX1 + EC/PrezX2 + Gov/PrezX3
+ Paired/EMX4 + ThreatX5 + PopX6 + GDPX7 + e _

The sample size of this model is the number of years analyzed, seven (2004-2010), times
the number of states (plus the District of Columbia), 51, so the total number of
observations of each variable is 357. The dependent variable, Y, is the total funding
awarded to states through Homeland Security’s “Domestic Preparedness and AntiTerrorism” programs. Table 4 provides the summary statistics for all of the independent
variables in all models.

Models 2-7
Models two through seven are regressions of various grant programs over a varying
number of years. The CPP, EMPG, SHSGP, MMRS, and UASI grant program allocations were
analyzed for the years 2003-2006. The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
(LETPP), however, did not exist in 2003, so its funding was analyzed for the years 20042006. Funding for each of the 6 programs was regressed on the same variables as in Model
1. The general model for each of the programs is specified as:
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Yf = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 +e _

Where Yf denotes the amount funded through a certain program, X1 – X7 represent the seven
independent variables Appropriations, EC/Prez, Gov/Prez, Paired/EM, Threat, Population, and GDP,
and e _denotes the random error in the model.

More specifically:
Programf = β0 + AppropriationsX1 + EC/PrezX2 + Gov/PrezX3
+ Paired/EMX4 + ThreatX5 + PopX6 + GDPX7 + e_

The sample size of this model is the number of years analyzed, four (2003-2006), times the
number of states plus the District of Columbia, 51, so the total number of observations is
204. The only exception to this is the LETTP program, which lacks a year compared to the
others, and thus has 153 observations. The dependent variable, Y, is the amount of funding
awarded to states through each specific program.
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable
Dependent (Funding)
Total (2004-2010)
CCP
EMPG
SHSGP
LETPP
MMRS
UASI
Independent
Appropriations
EC/Prez
Gov/Prez
Paired/EM
Threat
Population
GDP

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

357
204
204
204
153
204
204

103528.2
402.109
7165.196
24917.25
7779.477
693.823
13294.41

154487.6
328.714
56967.51
21835.25
6193.998
972.799
27928.19

2006
100
1390
4160
1500
0
0

1341808
2170
2710
164280
41270
6670
202340

561
561
561
561
561
561
561

0.627
0.59
0.502
0.686
1.569
5518077
233000000

0.937
0.492
0.501
0.464
1.035
6108742
281000000

0
0
0
0
0
493782
20100000

6
1
1
1
4
33900000
1670000000

*All Funding is in thousands of dollars ($000). *Independent variables were observed 51 times each year from
'04-'10 for Total funding, and 51 times each year from '03-'06, thus 561 observations. *LETPP only existed from
'04-'06. *Std. Dev = Standard Deviation. *Obs = Observations
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It may be of concern that some of these variables are collinear in nature. I tested for this,
and found that none of the political factors were collinear, although Appropriations, GDP,
and Population are somewhat collinear, as well as Threat, GDP, and Population. Population
and GDP are almost completely collinear, with R2 =0.9889, as can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5: Collinearity of Variables
Appropriations EC/Prez
Appropriations
1
ECPrez
GovPrez
PairedEM
Threat
Population
Gdp

-0.0607
0.0453
0.1159
0.3571
0.592
0.6052

1
0.1187
-0.0042
-0.0725
-0.018
-0.0365

Gov/Prez PairedEM

1
0.0561
-0.0786
0.044
0.0434

Threat

1
0.2084
0.1102
0.1449

Population

1
0.5922
0.602

1
0.9889

Findings
Model 1: Anti-Terrorism and Domestic Preparedness Funding 2004-2010
The results of this analysis were not entirely as expected. When analyzing political factors,
only one of the four variables were statistically significant, and some coefficients were
negative, contrary to the expected impacts. The coefficient of determination was relatively
strong (R2=0.7022),
Perhaps the most surprising find is that the independent variable Threat did not yield to be
statistically significant, and actually yielded the highest p-value of all independent
variables, at p=0.874. It also had a negative impact on funding. The fact that threat had no
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significant effect on grant funding, especially when using a basic threat model, could raise a
lot of questions.
Table 6: Results

Model 1
Total

Model 2
Model 3
Non-discretionary

Domestic Preparedness
and Anti-Terrorism
Total Funding '04-'10

CCP

EMPG

'03-'06

'03-'06

1737.25
(7707.440)

-46.34**
(18.374)

-4639.249
(5172.962)

33506.31***
(975.85)

-1.462
(15.196)

9265.060
(8869.656)

Gov/Prez

-10513.930

6.543

3930.282

Political party of the Governor matching
the party of the President (either 0 or 1)

(10373.910)

(11.339)

(4325.852)

1911.320

14.953

-4406.893

(6239.540)

(12.160)

(4771.378)

-1226.590
(7710.925)

1.653
(12.988)

6319.805
(6188.291)

-17578.0**
(8651.00)
730.3***
(227100.00)

0.0538***
(0.012)
-0.13
(0.31)

18.500
(0.017)
46.00
(422.00)

-22101.750
(11602.180)

101.779
(23.848)

-4892.443
(7125.231)

Independent Variables

Political Factors
Appropriations
Number of elected officials representing
each state on the Subcommittee of
Appropriations for Homeland Security

EC/Prez
States Electoral College Representatives
voted for the winning President (either 0
or 1)

Paired/EM
Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Paired (either 0 or 1)`

Risk factors
Threat
Based on whether or not a state is
coastal, border, has a major urban
population, or a mass transit system

Control
Population
Based on 2000 U.S. Census

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Constant

2
0.7022
0.9142
0.133
R
357
204
204
Number of Observations
Notes. In thousands ($000). Standard errors are robust. Population in millions. GDP in billions.
p<.10*; p<.05**; p<.01*** (two tailed).

HSGP: An Analysis of the Determinants of Federal Homeland Security Funding to States

Miles 24

The control variable, Population, however, is statistically significant, although the
coefficient is very small, and is actually negative, each state receiving approximately $17
million less for every one million citizens it has (or $17 less per person). GDP also tested
statistically significant, each state receiving approximately $730,000 for every billion
dollars grossed.
The findings of this analysis support that a state’s Electoral College Representatives voting
for the winning president implies a statistically significant (p=0.001) positive impact on
funding, averaging $33.5 million more per year for those states, which is an unexpectedly
large, positive amount of money
A state’s Governor’s political party affiliation, on the other hand, actually implies a negative
impact on funding, with those states receiving an average of $10.5 million less in funding
per year, although this measurement is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, the
number of Representatives a state has on either the Senate or House Subcommittee of
Appropriations does not yield a statistically significant result either, although the estimated
impact is positive, each state receiving $1.7 million more in total funds for every
representative it has on a Subcommittee, a number that was unexpectedly small.
Models 2-3: Non-Discretionary
In analyzing the Emergency Management Preparedness and Citizens Corp nondiscretionary grant programs across the years 2003-2006, the results yielded very little
statistical significance. The coefficient of determination was strong for the CCP
(R2=0.9412), but extremely weak (R2=0.130) for EMPG. This would imply that there is
something inherently different about the way funds for the two programs are allocated, yet
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they are supposedly allocated based on the same fair-share formula, where each state is
guaranteed 0.75 percent of total funds, and the rest is allocated based on population.
Considering this, it is surprising that population tested statistically significant for the CCP
(each state receiving a small amount of approximately $53 per million people), while EMPG
was not significantly affected by population.
Even more surprising is that although Appropriations was statistically significant for the
Citizens Corps Program, the coefficient was negative, each state receiving $46,000 less for
every Representative they have on a Subcommittee of Appropriations for Homeland
Security. Although not significant, the coefficient for Appropriations was negative for EMPG
as well.
Models 4-7: Discretionary
Models 4-7, the discretionary programs, each had strong positive correlations
(0.7292≤R2≤0.9472), and resulted in many statistically significant findings. Perhaps the
most interesting of these findings is that, like the non-discretionary programs, the variable
Appropriations had a negative coefficient for all programs, two of which were statistically
significant (p<0.10). For every Representative a state has on a Subcommittee of
Appropriations for Homeland Security, they receive approximately $43.3 million less in
State Homeland Security Grant Program funding, and $0.1 million less in Metropolitan
Medical Response System grant funding. The fact that the coefficient for Appropriations was
negative for every individual grant program, and was statistically significant for three of the
six programs, implies that having a Representative on a Subcommittee of Appropriations
for Homeland Security actually has a strong negative impact on funding.
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Table 7: Results

Independent Variables

Model 4

Model 5
Model 6
Discretionary

Model 7

SHSGP

LETPP

MMRS

UASI

'03-'06

'04-'06

'03-'06

'03-'06

-4330.017*
(974.178)

-113.1874
(229.661)

-109.1167*
(63.560)

-569.961
(1270.25)

-1773.025
(1232.902)

325.243
(247.083)

413.702***
(90.777)

-4070.81*
(2145.125)

162.535
(958.007)

-124.463
(224.275)

28.543
(67.447)

213.622
(2058.131)

2306.107**
(977.955)

192.130
(240.725)

62.350
(64.470)

1105.361
(148.094)

-305.327
(977.955)

20.854
(203.423)

37.678
(48.472)

-1079.584
(1528.889)

5.80**
(1.05)

0.52**
(0.26)

0.0944***
(0.06)

-08.04***
2.63

60.4***
(23.70)

-10.30
(6.45)

-1.12
(1.42)

265.0***
(64.00)

22853.980
(1642.737)

3869.162
(369.729)

-225.335
(105.874)

2894.590
(3896.231)

0.9107
204

0.9472
153

0.7659
204

0.7292
204

Political Factors
Appropriations
Number of elected officials representing
each state on the Subcommittee of
Appropriations for Homeland Security

EC/Prez
States Electoral College Representatives
voted for the winning President (dummy
variable either 0 or 1)

Gov/Prez
Political party of the Governor matching the
party of the President (dummy variable
either 0 or 1)

Paired/EM
Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Paired (dummy variable either
0 or 1)

Risk factors
Threat
Based on whether or not a state is coastal,
border, has a major urban population, or a
mass transit system

Control
Population
Based on 2000 U.S. Census

GDP
Constant
R2
Number of Observations

Notes. In thousands ($000). Standard errors are robust. Population in millions. GDP in billions.
p<.10*; p<.05**; p<.01*** (two tailed).
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The variable EC/Prez also yielded two statistically significant results, each state whose
Electoral College voted for the winning president receiving approximately $0.4 million
more funding for the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program, yet $4.1
million less for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program. These results, combined
with the fact that the variable also tested statistically significant for total “Domestic
Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” funding, signifies that there is a significant relationship
between the way the state’s Electoral College voted and the political party of the president
that affects funding. However, since the coefficient fluctuates between positive and
negative, the validity of this relationship is questionable.
The variable Paired/EM tested statistically significant for the State Homeland Security
Grant Program, each state receiving approximately $2.3 million more in funds if their Office
of Homeland Security and Division of Emergency Management or Public Safety physically
shares an office location.
Population was significant for every discretionary program, although the coefficient was
surprisingly negative for the UASI program. GDP was also statistically significant and
positive for the SHSGP and UASI programs, implying that larger grossing states receive
more funds. However, the coefficients for the LETPP and MMRS programs were negative, as
it also was for the non-discretionary CCP program. Although these negative coefficients did
not prove statistically significant, they lead one to assume that funding may not be heavily
influenced by a state’s gross domestic product (GDP).
Interestingly, Threat did not test statistically significant for any discretionary program,
which is extremely surprising, especially considering that the SHSGP, LETPP, MMRS, and
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UASI programs are supposedly allocated based on risk. Even more interesting is the fact
that, similar to total “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” funding, the Threat
coefficients for the SHSGP and UASI programs were actually negative.

Conclusions
The process by which the Department of Homeland Security has been scrutinized,
speculations circulating that grant funds are allocated as a function of political factors
rather than terrorism risk. Given the results of the empirical data, there are several
conclusions that can be made. First and foremost, it is clear that risk, captured by a series of
fundamental and transparent factors, is not an influencing factor of Homeland Security
Grant Program Funding. Threat never tested statistically significant for any of the seven
models, and actually resulted in negative coefficients for the UASI and SHSGP programs, as
well as for total “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-terrorism” programs funds.
Furthermore, the variables Appropriations, EC/Prez, and Paired/EM all tested statistically
significant for at least one program, Appropriations and EC/Prez showing significance more
multiple programs. This leads me to conclude that funds are allocated as a function of
politics rather than risk.

Limitations and Caveats
There were several limitations, as discussed throughout this study, the following were the
most problematic of which:


Information regarding individual grant program funding to states could only be
found for the years 2003-2006;
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AIR’s Terrorism Loss Estimation Model could not be accessed to use in modeling the
variable Threat for this analysis;



In future research, it might be of interest to include an independent variable for
“swing vote” states, drawing from Hoover and Pecorino’s theory that those states
whose Electoral College Representatives didn’t vote for the sitting president, yet
have a high possibility of doing so in the next election, receive more funding.
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Resources for Data Collection


Total “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” Program funding: U.S. Census
Bureau “Federal Aid to States Report.” For Fiscal Years 2004-2010.



Individual Grant Program Funding for 2003-2006:
Maguire, Steven, and Reese, Shawn. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33770.
“Department of Homeland Security Grants to States and Local Governments FY2003
to FY2006.” Published December 22, 2006. Accessed March 31, 2012.



House and Senate Subcommittees of Appropriations for Homeland Security:
http://opensecrets.org



Electoral College Voting and Election Results: http://presidentelect.us



State Governor Political Party Affiliation: http://www.nga.org/cms/governors
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Paired with Emergency Management: Department of Homeland Security. State
Homeland Security Contacts. http://www.dhs.gov/state-homeland-securitycontacts



Population: 2000 Census.
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/maps/respop.html
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